IV. To the Reasons against the Second Opinion when Holding the Second Opinion

84. For someone who does not like this opinion (which, however, does not seem to contradict the faith, as was touched on when explaining it [nn.56, 68-71]), if he likes the second opinion more (which is the common one [n.15]), one can reply to the reasons against [nn.33-55] this second opinion:

To the first [n.33] the response is by denial of the proposition ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in the case of a relation that constitutes a supposit, and is true in the case of other ones. When it is proved by the fact that ‘a relation is not related, but something which is not merely relation is related by relation’, and when it is further said that ‘what is related is prior to relation’ [n.33], - it is denied.a

a [Interpolation] Holding to the second opinion, which is more common, one can respond to the reasons against it:

     To the first [n.33], that a relation is not related is conceded; but something that is not merely relation is related by a relation; not the essence indeed, but the supposit is related, because supposit is not merely a relation (but it is, however, a relative, not an absolute), - and so the whole deduction is conceded up to the final consequence [sc. that the suppposit is there really and naturally before the relation], and that consequence is denied.

85. To the proposition that says ‘one must understand the parts and the union of the parts prior to any composite’ [n.34], if they hold that relation is not in the essence as an act in what receives act, they should say that in the person itself - which is a quasiwhole - one should not pre-understand an in-forming of a quasi-part by a quasi-part before the whole is understood, but one should if such a quasi-informing is preunderstood, though as by way of a denominating form. But when one holds the second opinion [n.15], it seems one should better say that relation is not a quasi-form or an act with respect to the essence (as was touched on in distinction 5 [d.5 nn.113,131, 137-138]), but rather the essence seems to be a quasi-form and quasi-act, whereby a subsistent relation is God. And this seems proved by the fact that whenever a foundation is potential to a relation, the foundation is in-formed by the relation before the supposit is; conceded too - as a result of this - is that in that case [sc. when the foundation is potential to a relation] the related thing is formally ‘being to’ by the foundation itself or in accord with the foundation itself, just as Socrates is conceded to be white by whiteness or in accord with whiteness. Neither seems it should be granted in the issue at hand: neither that paternity exists in the essence before in the Father, - nor that the Father by deity or in accord with deity is the Father formally, because this seems to accord with Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.2 n.3: ‘he is Father by one thing, he is God by another’; but he is God by deity formally - he is not therefore Father by deity formally, but by something else, according to Augustine.

86. Therefore one can speak differently (when holding the second opinion) that, although the parts and the union of the parts are pre-required for the whole, and quasiparts and the union of quasi-parts are pre-required for the quasi-whole, yet, where there is no partial-ness but perfect identity of the things that would otherwise be parts unless one or other of them were infinite, the union of such should not be pre-understood to the whole but rather the perfect identity of one thing with another should be pre-understood. And so it seems to be in the issue at hand, that to the Father - which is said to be first related - there is in some way pre-understood a perfect identity of the relation with the essence, but not the union of a quasi-form to some quasi-matter or quasi-potential; nor is such perfect identity a reason that the essence is formally denominated by the relation.

87. But if the reason [n.34] be confirmed by the fact that ‘nothing is a quantity first and per se unless something is a quantity per se and not first but denominatively’ [cf. n.35, to which note however this confirmation does not entirely correspond], I say that if a quantity could be the same as something which would otherwise be susceptive of it, and the same could be such that it did not in-form it, then something could well be a quantity first and yet nothing would be a quantity by in-forming (nor does this seem remarkable, because the ‘first’ seems to be separated from that which is ‘per se and not first’); therefore in this way something can be posited as related first although nothing is related ‘not first but per se’, as if informed by the relation.a

a [Interpolation] To what is argued at ‘in accord with this’ [see interpolation to n.35], this proposition is denied, that ‘what is related is first something to itself’.

     To the first proof, which is taken from Augustine, I reply: ‘what is related is something when the relative is removed’, that is, it includes something absolute which is the foundation of the relation; and therefore if the Father ‘is nothing to himself’ (that is, does not include anything absolute), he will not be Father ‘to another’. But Augustine does not understand that every relative is formally to itself before it is to another by relation.

     As to the second proof, the conclusion or the proposition is denied which it rests on for proof, namely that ‘that which is related is prior to the relation’, or - which is the same - that ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in the case of a relation that constitutes a supposit, and it is true in the case of other things.

     When proof is given by division [sc. into three]: if one of the three members of the division should be granted, the one that should more be granted is that relation is prior, the way form is prior ‘to an entity that exists by form’; nor does the inference ‘the supposit is thus quasiposterior to the relation, therefore it is a relation’ follow, but rather ‘therefore it is a relation or a relative constituted by a relation’, -- and the second alternative here is true.

88. To the second [nn36-37] I say that, just as any form is per se such a form, nor is there any intrinsic reason why it is such a form, so too some relation by its very self is formally real and some relation is by itself formally only a relation of reason; however sometimes there are extrinsic effective or material causes of the former or the latter, sometimes too there are some caused things or some posterior signs from which the relations mentioned can by inferred by a demonstration-‘that’. I say that identity, because it is identity, is a relation of reason, nor is there any other formal reason ‘because of which’ it is so, - paternity, because it is paternity, is a real relation, nor is there any other formal reason ‘because of which’ it is so. Yet because a real relation is of a nature to have extrinsic causes causing it, then, speaking generally in the case of creatures, the consequence here is that a relation that does not have such causes is not real, just as on the destruction of the cause there follows the destruction of the caused thing; likewise, some real relation, if it does not have such a prior distinction of causes, does at any rate cause a distinction. And then from the removal of both the cause and the caused (one of which corresponds to the real relation) the conclusion can be drawn that some relation is not real, such that the consequence holds that ‘this relation does not pre-require distinct extremes, nor does it make them to be distinct, therefore it is not a real relation’ [n.37], and then one must look for the middle terms that prove why the premises are true; but the consequence is good, just as from the destruction of the cause follows the destruction of the caused, and from the removal of the caused follows the removal of the cause from it, because at least one of them should concur for a real relation, such that wherever either is removed there results - a consequence through extrinsic facts - the removal of the real relation. When it is said that “therefore to infer ‘the relation is not real because it is not between distinct things’ is to infer ‘it is not real because it is not real’” [n.37] I say no, because although it does not distinguish the extremes for this reason, namely that ‘it is not real’, because it is arguing from cause to caused - yet the consequence ‘it does not distinguish, therefore it is not real’ does follow, as from caused to cause (and this when the clause is added ‘because it does not pre-require distinct things’), because then there concur there both a denial of the cause of the real relation and a denial of the sign, from the concurrence of which the negation of the real relation is perfectly inferred.a

a [Interpolation] but sometimes relations go along with a preceding distinction, and sometimes not, but only with a formally caused one [n.37].

     And not only is there a real relation of will to will, but also of will as active to itself as passive, and universally an effect dependent on an active and a passive principle necessarily requires a real relation; and yet the will, which is the foundation of these opposite relations, namely ‘of mover and moved’, is denominated by both of them.

     I say that it is necessary to prove, in order to infer the conclusion, that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, by a distinction pertaining to the genus of relation, just as this consequence ‘they [sc. the extremes] are said of the same thing, therefore they are not real’ does not follow; it does not hold from the nature of the thing, without any act of intellect. Hence it can well be conceded. If however these points are proved, the consequence is good. But one must eventually come back to this, when one has set aside that which belongs to the distinction of the extremes; for the consequence ‘if a relation does not follow from the nature of the thing it is not real’ at once follows. One should expound the antecedent, and say that ‘the extremes are not distinguished by a distinction preceding the relation.’

     To the third one can say that an absolute can very well be the term of a relation, and it always is in relations of measured things - and this is principally preserved in distinction 30 [nn.35-40], that the relations of creatures terminate in God insofar as he is absolute; but universally speaking, one should not concede that the term of a relation is an absolute save in dissimilar relations (about which the argument is there), namely those that are in a genus (divine relations are not of this sort), or about the formal term (namely by reason of which the first term terminates), but not about the first term: for as the foundation in a related thing is an absolute, but not always what is related is an absolute (according to this opinion [sc. the third]), so thus too what is the reason for terminating a relation is always an absolute, and it is pre-required on the part of the relative term as the foundation is on the part of the related thing.

89. To the first argument about the second way [n.38] I say that the proposition is false that ‘relation cannot be the formal term of origin’, as will be appear in the material ‘On the Incarnation’ [III d.1 nn.57-61]; and however it be with the formal cause, at least a relative can be the first produced term, such that the essence ‘to itself’ - in the relative -is the formal term, and thus was it posited in distinction 5, in the production of the person [d.5 nn.27-30, 64-71, 97]. When therefore the argument says ‘a relation is originated unless an absolute is originated’ [n.58], if you understand ‘to be originated as the first term of production’, one can concede it about a relation but not about a relative - but if you understand it about ‘to be originated as the first formal term’, then it can simply be conceded; and in neither way is it against the issue at hand, because neither is relation posited as what is first originated, but the supposit is - nor is relation set down as the formal term of production, but an essence simply absolute is.

90. To the second I say that ‘the Father originates the Son’ is for the Father to have the Son for correlative (not for any correlative, but for a correlative of this sort, because such co-relation is a relation of origin), and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about the supposit as if pre-understood to origin), and it will be made clear in distinction 28 nn.93-99, 108-110.a

a [Interpolation] therefore one extreme can be prior to another in origin, although it be simultaneous in nature - and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about a supposit as pre-understood to origin or about the priority of supposit to action), and it will be made clear in distinction 28; [or another text] therefore one extreme can be prior in origin to another, although it be simultaneous in nature. This response, and likewise to the second (about the priority of supposit to action) will be made clear in distinction 28.

91. As to the third [n.41], it seems difficult to respond to those who say that the persons are relative and that relations are the principles of acting [e.g. Henry of Ghent], because then neither on the part of the agent nor on the part of the principle can there be liberty; but although the second opinion may be held as far as concerns the first, yet I have denied the second in distinction 7 [nn.20-26, 35-42].

92 To the fourth [n.42] is said that ‘it is generation’, because this relation has the force of constituting primary substance in the divine nature [n.65]; and one must say -when holding this way - that relation can be the property of a personal subsistent in divine nature just as if it were some absolute property.a

a [Interpolation] and thus the production of it will be the production of what subsists in the nature of substance; and therefore it is ‘generation’, because generation is generation from a formal term (which is the nature communicated to the produced thing), but not from the individual or incommunicable property of the produced thing - just as universally every motion receives its species from the formal term of the motion.

93. The arguments about the third way [nn.45, 51-52] seem difficult, and yet they are soluble if the second opinion [n.15] is true. Let him solve them who knows [cf. Lectura I d.26 n.75].

94. The authorities about the fourth way can be expounded otherwise [sc. in favor of the second opinion], the way authorities are commonly drawn to one sense or another.a

a [Interpolation] To the other [the first about the third way, n.45] I say that paternity is of itself formally incommunicable; not however the concept which - according to what is said elsewhere [d.8] - can be abstracted from divine and created paternity, but the reality that is in divine reality, which is not formally the essence itself, is incommunicable formally and as it were through an extrinsic determination, namely ‘because it is divine’. The reason for its incommunicability is this, that just as essence is ultimate act and therefore cannot be determined by anything with respect to which it is quasi potential, so whatever is in it is ultimate, in the ultimate act possible for it, so that in the instant of nature in which wisdom burgeons in the essence, it burgeons according to the ultimate determination that it is able to have; hence too the reality that is wisdom formally is not determinable. Likewise, whatever can be incommunicable in the first instance of nature in which it burgeons in nature burgeons as incommunicable, and not as first communicable, because then it would be determinable by something by which it would be made incommunicable.

     And if you say that then paternity is not incommunicable save because it is in the divine essence, for this reality does not have whereby it might of itself be ultimately determinate save because it is in the essence, - I say that whatever is quasi originally or fundamentally intrinsic in divine reality is from the essence, because according to Damascence (ch.9) it is a ‘certain sea of infinite substance’; but yet the other things have formally their own ideas and are by themselves such first formally, so that wisdom, although it has from the essence quasi fundamentally and originally that it is a perfection simply, is yet formally a perfection simply and is in itself formally infinite - such that in the same instant of nature in which wisdom is now in act in the essence, let the essence be per impossibile removed and the understanding of wisdom simply and infinite will remain. So in the ‘now’ of nature in which paternity is understood in the essence, it is in itself formally incommunicable, the essence being then per impossibile removed.

     Nor is there a contradiction here that something quasi originally or causally have from something which belongs to it formally, just as the hot is formally contrary to the cold, although causally it comes from fire to which it is not formally contrary. So it is in the case of other things, because the essence by which something is constituted in its specific being is of itself formally indivisible into several species, even given per impossibile that it were uncaused, although now it has causally that lack of division from which it comes causally.

     And if you object ‘why does some other entity arise as communicable in the essence and this one as incommunicable?’ - I say that of this fact there is no formal reason other than that this entity is this and that entity is that; and this entity ‘because this’ is communicable and that entity ‘because that’ is incommunicable, such that the latter can only arise if it arise formally incommunicable, and the former only if it arise formally communicable. But the reason for this is extrinsic - quasi fundamental or original - because the essence is radically infinite, from which can intrinsically arise not only perfections simply and communicable, but also incommunicable properties; each of them arises, however, when it arises, with the determinate, highest determination possible for it.

     Hereby is plain the answer to all the proofs that paternity is of itself not incommunicable [nn.46-50]:

     For when you say that ‘it is not of itself a this’ [n.47], I say this is false, understanding it formally of the reality that is paternity and not of the concept common to this paternity and to that, because (as was expounded in distinction 8 nn.136-150 and will be stated in III Suppl. d.22 q. un. nn.7-8) there can be some concept without an order of realities outwardly, one of which realities is contractive or determinative of the other. Paternity, however - that is the reality - is not of itself a ‘this’, that is fundamentally, but is so from the essence, and from this very same essence it is incommunicable paternity, because it is not a ‘this’ before it is incommunicable and because it is afterwards made quasi-incommunicable by something else that determines it, but there arises, without any order of singularity for incommunicability in that reality, a reality supremely determinate in the first instant of nature in which it arises.

     Nor is the proposition true that ‘every quiddity is communicable’ [n.26], but only a quiddity that is perfection simply or divisible (for the first is communicated in unity of nature, the second is communicated along with division of it); this quiddity is neither a perfection simply nor divisible, because it is in a nature simply perfect.

     Nor is the proposition true that ‘opposite relations are equally communicable of themselves’ [nn.48-49], nay active inspiriting arises as communicable to two, nor can it ever by made incommunicable by anything that determines it; but passive inspiriting is, in the same instant in which it exists in divine reality, of itself formally incommunicable.

     Also as to what you say that ‘whatever position is set down - possible or impossible - it will, with its idea standing in place, remain incommunicable’ [n.50], I concede ‘with its idea standing in place’ and do not concede ‘when something is posited repugnant to its idea’. But if one sets down that its idea is standing in place and there is something repugnant to it, from opposites in the antecedent follow opposites, namely that it is incommunicable of itself formally and can be communicated; so in the issue at hand: if one posits that inspiriting precedes active generation, one posits something incompossible with the paternity of the Father and yet the idea of paternity remains, and thus it follows that paternity is communicable from what is first and yet incommunicable from what is second; hence it is formally a contradiction for generation to be the second production in divine reality.

     Paternity, therefore, because divine, is incommunicable, such that the ‘because’ is a circumstance of the original or fundamental principle, though not a contracting or determining principle, in the way in which white is contracted when ‘white man’ is said or ‘human whiteness’; for this whiteness is pre-understood as existing in itself, and as such it would be indeterminate and able to be determined so as to be of a man (and to this it is determined when ‘human whiteness’ is said), but not that whiteness arise from the nature of man and that in that very instant it be of itself indeterminate. So - oppositely - in the issue at hand, because just as a cause would not give being to the effect unless it gave itself ‘a being agreeable to the effect’, and just as it would not produce the effect unless it produced something that was of a nature to have such an effect (for example, no cause would cause a triangle formally unless it produced something that necessarily had three angles equal to two right angles, and if it could produce something that did not necessarily have three such angles, it would not produce a triangle but something else, - nor is there any reason for this save that the formal idea of triangle is that it be a triangle), so I say that deity would not be the fundamental reason for any intrinsic reality unless the reality arises such that - in the first instant in which it is - it is determinate with ultimate determination; if therefore it produce something determinable by some reality that is as it were adventitious to it when already produced, it would not produce something intrinsic in divine reality, - even if it were to produce something communicable, it would not produce a personal property, but something in some way different from it.

     To the other proof [n.51] I say that although some common concept might be obtained that is stated in the ‘what’ of divine generation and of divine inspiriting (nay perhaps that might be stated in the ‘what’ of divine and created paternity), yet no reality can exist in divine reality in any way distinct on the part of the thing - wherefrom this concept stated in the ‘what’ may be taken -which reality might be determinable by some other reality, as a concept is determinable in the intellect by some other concept; and the possibility of this and the reason for it has sufficiently been touched on [d.8 nn.135-150].

     I say therefore that paternity and filiation are not primarily diverse as to understanding such that the intellect not be able to abstract from them some common reality, but they are primarily diverse as to reality and reality, so that they include no one grade of reality which is quasi potential and determinable by proper differences (or quasi by proper differences), the way that whiteness and blackness include some reality of the same idea that is determinable by proper differences specific to them, from which their specific differences are taken. And then the major proposition, that ‘the first distinguishing things are first diverse’ [n.51], should only be understood of the realities themselves that first constitute them as to their non-agreement in some one formal reality, which they formally include.

     To the other proof, about a supposit per accidens [n.52], I say that in one way the metaphysician speaks of the ‘per accidens’ and in another way the logician; for the metaphysician says that there is a being ‘per accidens’ that includes in itself things of two genera, as is clear in Metaphysics ‘about being’ and ‘about one’, V.7 and 6. 1017a7-22, 1015b16-36; the logician says that a proposition is ‘per accidens’ whose subject does not include the reason for the inherence of the predicate, and if one concept is made from two such - neither of which is per se determinative of the other - he says that that concept is ‘one per accidens’. There is no example in creatures of a logical concept ‘one per accidens’ save a concept to which there corresponds a ‘one per accidens’ metaphysically, because although this proposition ‘the rational is animal’ is per accidens, yet by joining one concept to the other, one concept is per se determinative of the other; therefore the whole concept is not one per accidens, but only some concept that puts together concepts of two genera is one per accidens, and to it there always corresponds a ‘one per accidens’ in the hands of the metaphysician.

     To the matter at issue. This proposition can be conceded per accidens ‘paternity is deity’, because the subject as subjected does not include the reason for the inherence of the predicate as predicated, because the subject is not formally the predicate. Also by joining the concept of the subject to the concept of the predicate (thus: ‘God is Father’), one concept does not per se determine the other, because according to Damascene [ch.50] properties determine hypostases not nature; therefore the concept is not ‘per se one’, and so it does not state the concept ‘of a per se supposit’ with respect to another; for what is not in itself ‘per se one’ is not the ‘per se supposit’ of anything, and just as this is not so in reality so it is not so in concepts. Thus therefore, speaking logically, one could concede that the Father is not a ‘per se supposit’ of God.

     But against this I argue that the first identity cannot be per accidens, and as not in things so not in concepts either; but the first identity in predication seems to be of the first nature with its supposit; therefore this identity is not per accidens but per se.

     I reply: the first identity of predication is of whatever exists to itself, as ‘man is man’, ‘God is God’. But comparing God here to supposit and asking about identity there, I say that speaking really according to the metaphysician - since there are no genera here nor anything of any genus (from distinction 8 nn.95-115) - nothing here will be a being per accidens; nor does this inference hold ‘it is a supposit per accidens logically, therefore it is a supposit per accidens metaphysically’, because ‘it is a supposit’ states the disposition of something as subject to something as to a predicate, and so a supposit can be said to be ‘per accidens’ because of accidentality on the part of inherence, not on the part of the extremes.

     And if it be objected ‘here it is conceded that there are things as it were of two genera, namely of substance and accident’, I reply: the proper idea of things, as concerns genera or quasigenera, does not make a ‘whole’ to be a being per accidens, but the disposition of thing to thing does, namely non-identity simply; but now although the proper idea of relation - which remains there - does not include formally the idea of essence, yet one real thing is truly the same as the other, because of which identity there is no disposition of reality to reality of the sort required of things that constitute a ‘being per accidens’.

     If it be objected against the first member [sc. accidentality on the part of inherence], ‘since in creatures there can be per se a supposit of nature, why is it not so here?’, one could say that an imperfect absolute can be incommunicable, and universally anything ‘that contracts per se in any genus’ can be incommunicable, just as can anything communicable, - and so in any created thing that pertains to any genus there can be something of that genus which constitutes an incommunicable; but a simply perfect thing cannot be incommunicable, nor anything of the same idea (everything absolute in divine reality is of this sort, according to the third way), and therefore nothing ‘quasi of the same genus as the essence’ can constitute there a supposit, but only something that is as if of another genus. An example: if anything of the genus of substance, up to the ultimate element by which it is constituted as ‘this substance’, were a perfection simply and consequently communicable, ‘this substance’ could not be further contracted in itself through anything (because what is a ‘this’ is not further determinable in itself), but only something of the genus of quantity or quality could constitute ‘in this substance’ something incommunicable, because quantity or quality would not be a perfection simply; then that thing constituted from substance and quantity would be a supposit per accidens (and also would be a being per accidens), if one of those realities were not perfectly the same as the other. - So in the issue at hand the position is that essence is a perfection simply, and whatever is of the same genus as the essence exist ‘to itself’; and therefore anything such is communicable, and yet is of itself a ‘this’. And further: that which is of itself a ‘this’ cannot be contracted, but only in that which is a ‘this’ can something incommunicable be constituted by something which is not a perfection simply, and therefore something not of the same genus as the essence but quasi other.

     Hereby one can say to the other confirmation, whereby is inferred ‘the identity of created substance to its supposit would be truer than the identity of the divine nature with its’; this does not follow, if it be understood on the part of the thing, because although an individual entity in a creature per se determines nature and makes it ‘per se one’ with it, yet that ‘one’ is composite by some composition that is also real, - but relation, although it does not per se determine the divine nature, yet is so truly the same as it that no composition there can come to be; and therefore, really or metaphysically speaking, the identity of the divine supposit is much truer, both in itself and with the nature, than the identity of a created supposit is in itself or with its nature, - but logically speaking one can well concede that a created substance is formally predicated of its supposit (because predicated ‘per se in the first mode’), but ‘God’ is not so predicated of the Father, because ‘Father’ does not have so per se one a concept in the intellect as ‘Socrates’ does.

     If you infer ‘therefore this predication is truer than that’, the consequence can be denied, because some predication that is not formal, or not per se, can be truer than some predication that is formal and per se, provided however there is a greater identity of the real extremes, in whose concept however there is less formal inclination or inherence.

     As to the final confirmation [sc. the third in the second interpolation to n.52], one can concede logically that of neither quiddity is there a ‘per se supposit’; but really it is a supposit of the nature, not of the relation, because relation there is an incommunicable property, but the nature is not. Likewise, the relation passes over into the essence and not conversely, because of the infinity of the essence.

     To the fourth [n.60 with interpolation]. Primary substance in creatures possesses something of perfection, namely ultimate unity (that is why it is indivisible), and this follows on ultimate actuality, because of which there belongs to it ‘per se existence’; two opposites come together in secondary substance, which is both divisible and does not have ‘existence’ save in primary substance. These conditions of primary substance are possessed by the divine essence of itself, and not formally by relation; for it is of itself a ‘this’ and it subsists of itself (that is it exists per se), or at any rate it is the whole reason for subsisting (therefore, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.6 n.11, the Father does not exist by that by which he is Father but by that by which he is God). More than this, primary created substance - because it is limited - does not possess communicability, because the same limited thing in number is not communicable; this property of primary substance does not belong to the divine essence.

     Hereby is plain the answer to the first point there touched on [n.60], because I concede that primary substance in divine reality, as that which is meant by ‘to be substance most of all and to subsist per se’, is not formally constituted by relation but by deity.

     Likewise to the second point [interpolation to n.61]: because ‘primary substance does not include non-substance’ is true, because of the conditions of perfection that belong to primary substance, and so, wherever those conditions are preserved, this will not be through non-substance; but in the nature in which there cannot exist through substance the condition which belongs to imperfection in created primary substance, namely incommunicability (the way it is posited in God, where anything ‘to itself’ is posited as simply perfect and so communicable), primary substance there must - as to possessing that condition - include non-substance.

     To the third point there touched on [n.62] I reply: paternity and this incommunicable paternity - whatever may be true of them in conception - are altogether the same in the thing, such that there is no distinction there formal or real; for the thing, in the first instant in which it exists or burgeons in the essence, exists there under the idea of the ultimate determination possible for it, otherwise in that instant it would be potential for determination. Because therefore determination for incommunicability is not repugnant to relation, for that reason it is not only a quiddity and a ‘this’ but incommunicable, and it is altogether not a ‘this’ in the thing before it is incommunicable; but ‘this’ deity is communicable, such that it is repugnant to it - according to this opinion [sc. the second] - to be by anything as it were of its genus incommunicable. I deny therefore the consequence ‘in relation there is quiddity, and this is incommunicable insofar as it is relation, therefore these cannot be found in that which exists to itself’, because incommunicability is repugnant to anything ‘to itself’; in God, according to this opinion, it is not repugnant to relation, and therefore relation has it at once.

     To the fourth point there touched on [n.63]: ‘to exist per se’ is conceded to ‘this essence’, or to God ‘whence he is God’, - but not to be able to be that by which formally something per se is, this belongs to created nature from its limitation, because of which it is incommunicable both as ‘what’ and as ‘by which’ (of this double incommunicability there was discussion in distinction 23 n.16). It is true, therefore, that created substance has ‘per se existence’, but accident not, and this belongs to substance form its perfection, - but the fact that it cannot communicate this ‘per se existence’ to something in which it exists, this is a mark of limitation. Here then I concede that essence is determined of itself to ‘per se existence’ (whether as ‘what’ or as ‘by which’), but that, along with this, it is communicable to a relative person, as that by which the relative person has the same ‘per se existence’.

     To the points about the fourth way [nn.53-55].

     To the first, from Augustine [n.54], the response was given after the response to the first argument against the second opinion [interpolation to n.87].

     To his other authority [n.54] here is the reply. Augustine there, On the Trinity VII ch.4 n.7, says how there is said to be ‘one essence’ and by the Greeks ‘three substances’ but by the Latins ‘three persons’; and in text that is adduced [n.54] (taken from ch.4), that ‘substance exists to itself’, because ‘they are not properly said to be three substances, because substance (the way it is conceded in divine reality) exists to itself, and therefore essence and substance are the same’ [ibid. ch.5 n.10]; he also says: “they are not to be called three substances, as they may not be called three essences” [ibid. ch.4 n.9]. He does not therefore intend that substance as the Greeks take it (namely for person) exists to itself [n.73], but that they concede three substances not properly but only because of a necessity of speaking; hence he seems to prefer the way of speaking of the Latins, that they are ‘three persons’ [ibid. ch.5 n.10]; but even that he proves consequently not to be proper, showing that person is simply said ‘to itself’, as is essence [ibid. ch.6 n.11]. Therefore take his final conclusion on this matter from there: “We want indeed some one word to serve for the meaning whereby the Trinity is understood, lest we should be altogether silent when someone asks ‘three what?’”

     When therefore the Latins speak of three persons or the Greeks of three substances, Augustine would say that they speak improperly and because of the necessity to speak. One does not therefore get from his intention that something which signifies incommunicable subsistent in divine reality exists to itself, but only that the names - which are accommodated by some for expressing such incommunicable subsistent - are in themselves absolute names, nay purely absolute, because they are essentials. But one should accept the first point from him, so that the proposed conclusion in this question on behalf of the third opinion [n.56] may be obtained (the opinion that posits that in the thing ‘this subsistent incommunicable’ exists to itself), and that so much cannot be expressed by any essential name, accommodated from use or the necessity of speaking.

     On behalf of the second opinion, use these means against everything that is adduced from Augustine [n.73].

     To the third, from Richard and Boethius [n.55], the response is that just as from the absolute and the relative - speaking quidditatively - can be abstracted something common quidditatively, so also from such and such incommunicable something common can be abstracted which is of itself neither an incommunicable absolute nor an incommunicable relative; some such thing is described by Richard and Boethius, with this added, that it exists ‘in intellectual nature’, so that as the description of the superior should not include the proper idea of anything inferior, so the description of person - by which it is incommunicable in intellectual nature - should not include anything properly pertaining to an incommunicable absolute, nor properly to an incommunicable relative, but ought to be indifferent to both; and thus do both describe person. I concede therefore that neither in the definition of person assigned by Boethius nor in the one assigned by Richard is anything relative posited, and so I say that neither is there posited anything whence the thing defined might express absolute existence, but it is indifferent to both; such that, just as in some nature there is not found ‘the assigned idea in general’ save in an absolute and by reason of an absolute (as in a creature), so in the divine nature it is not found save in a relative.